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“He would not meddle against Newark…” Cromwell’s strategic vision 1643-
1644. 
 
The royalist garrison at Newark was not only one of the most substantial and successful 
garrisons in England during the civil wars: its steadfast loyalty had a devastating effect on the 
military careers of several parliamentarian generals and colonels. Between 1643 and 1645 
Newark was responsible for, or played a role in, the severe mauling and even the 
termination of the careers of no less than five parliamentarian generals. The careers of two 
major generals in command of local forces, Sir Thomas Ballard, Sir John Meldrum; three 
regional commanders, Thomas, Lord Grey of Groby, commander of the Midlands 
Association, Francis, Lord Willoughby of Parham, lord lieutenant of Lincolnshire and Edward 
Montague, Earl of Manchester commander of the Eastern Association all suffered because of 
it. Furthermore, it dented the ambitions, if not the careers of two parliamentarian governor-
colonels: the Derby governor Sir John Gell and the Nottingham governor John Hutchinson. 
It is also true that being governor of Newark did little for the careers of three royalist 
officers who served in the role: Sir John Henderson (1642-1643), Richard Byron (1643-1644) 
and Sir John Willys (1644-1645). Most significantly from the perspective of this article, in the 
cases of at least three of the three aristocrat or magnate generals: Lord Grey of Groby, 
Lord Willoughby and the Earl of Manchester, Oliver Cromwell played an equally decisive 
role, alongside the midland garrison town, in terminating their field commissions. This article 
argues that whilst the actions, or rather the often alleged inactions of the three aristocrats 
in relation to Newark, may have done the aristocracy, or at least aristocratic military 
appointments no favours in Cromwell’s eyes, it was his perceptive vision of the importance 
of Newark which was most remarkable. In the early stages of his military career Cromwell 
demonstrated his ability to conceptualise strategy, during a period of his life he might have 
been expected to have been paying attention solely to developing his talents as a regimental 
and later a field officer in a growing horse regiment. 
 
Newark upon Trent 
Often referred to as a ‘gateway to the north’ there were several strategic angles to the 
importance of Newark, involving the roads and river upon which the town stood, and which 
its inhabitants used to make their livings. Of the two, the river should have been more 
important during the war than it seems to have been. The River Trent was a major 
waterway in the seventeenth century and the shipping of goods from the Baltic and near 
continent and the transport of coal and grain into and out of the county had made it so. 
Thus there was potential to both supply, and to deny supply, to the towns and villages which 
would house soldiers, garrisons and outlying billets for the armies raised and quartered in 
the region during the war. Newark of course was not alone: Nottingham too could be seen 
in this light. Holding the county town and its castle would enable a garrison to prevent 
goods being shipped either north and eastwards towards Newark or the port at Kingston 
upon Hull or westwards into south Derbyshire and Staffordshire. Yet little of the fighting in 
the area seems to have related to the control of river trade: it is rarely referred to. In 
February 1643 Certain Informations reported that the ‘Newarkers’ had stopped barges 
heading towards Nottingham, but this is an unusual reference to shipping waterborne 
goods. 1  It may be that the early seizure of Hull (April 1642) by parliament may have 
rendered the river less usable straight away and that the seizure of Nottingham, Trent 
Bridge and Newark almost simultaneously later in that same year prevented the free 
                                                          
1 British Library, Thomason Tracts, Certain Informations (London, 1643), No 4, 6-13 February, 
np. 
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movement of river traffic and was underscored by the occupation of the inland port of 
Gainsborough in 1643. The use of a pinnace to carry the Earl of Kingston away as a prisoner 
after his surrender of Gainsborough in July 1643 and his subsequent death on the boat, 
serves to underline the absence of other references.2 Nevertheless, we must not neglect the 
importance of the river as a source of power for the mills in the town which would need to 
produce an increased level of flour for the garrison in the town and the surrounding area, a 
point not lost on the third leaguer surrounding Newark from 1645 to 1646. The river is also 
important because of the road-crossing points; at Newark itself, Muskham Bridge, Trent 
Bridge, and the ferries in south Derbyshire, Cavendish Bridge south of Swarkstone and the 
bridge at Burton on Trent were the focus of actions aimed at control: as crossing points not 
as trade centres in themselves or as inland ports. Their importance was such that the same 
issue of Certain Informations which highlighted the stopping of river traffic referred to Sir 
John Gell’s intention to break the bridges at Swarkstone and Burton on Trent to hamper 
troop and materiel movement. The role of bridges serves further to underline the 
importance of the major roads: the Great North Road and Fosse way made Newark the 
conjunction of east-west and north-south travel which made the town a gem for the 
royalists who based themselves there. The royalist commander of the north and East Anglia, 
the Earl of Newcastle could send or receive men and supplies into the southern reaches of 
his command via this route. Naturally, the control of these roads confirmed Newark as a 
target for the parliamentarians based in the Eastern Association who wished to both 
interrupt the royalist hold on the midlands and establish communications with the 
parliamentarian garrisons at Derby and Nottingham, or from the association to the 
parliamentarian stronghold in Hull as well as the north in general. It was for these latter 
reasons that Newark became important to Colonel Oliver Cromwell and his regiment of 
horse as early as spring 1643. Quite simply Newark was also the gateway to the east, the 
west, the south and to the midlands; just as much as it was the gateway to the north: it 
simply depended on the strategic viewpoint of the observer.  
 
Newark had been garrisoned by the Nottinghamshire county high sheriff, Sir John Digby and 
a Scottish veteran of the war in Europe, Sir John Henderson, under the orders of the Earl of 
Newcastle who had assumed command of the north and east of England, at the tail end of 
1642.3 This occupation offset the seizure of Nottingham by John Hutchison and Sir John Gell: 
who had also seized Sheffield Castle and Derby and begun to establish control of Derbyshire. 
At the same time, the region as a whole was being organised by royalist Henry Hastings, 
who appointed colonel-general of the north midland counties in February. An attempt to 
crush Hastings’s developing central garrison at Ashby de la Zouch had become acrimonious 
in late January.4 Hastings’s parliamentarian counterpart, the young Lord Grey of Groby along 
with Gell had attacked the Ashby de la Zouch town and castle, but when Grey heard that 
Prince Rupert was on his way north to the garrison’s rescue he had drawn off and moved 
into south Leicestershire to block the prince’s march.5 Gell was furious at what he saw as 
precipitous end to the siege, as the Ashby forces were a serious barrier to his ambition to 
                                                          
2  Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle, Cavendish, The Life of William Cavendish, (London, 
George Routledge, 1906) (henceforward Newcastle, Life), p.80. 
3  Gell, J. ‘A True Relation of What Service Hath been Done by Colonel John Gell’, 
unpublished tract, in Glover, S., The History, Directory and Gazetteer of Derbyshire, (Derby, 
1829), (Henceforth Gell, ‘True relation), p.62. 
4 British Library, Thomason Tracts, E86/1 Special Passages no.24 January 17th – 24th, np, Gell, J, 
‘True Relation’, p.63. 
5 British Library, Thomason Tracts, Mercurius Aulicus, 3rd week, np. 
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dominate the region.6 Newark and its garrison was in the region over which Hastings had 
command, but because the garrison had been established on the direct orders of the Earl of 
Newcastle, it remained independent of Hastings to a great extent, nevertheless he would 
still be expected to support the garrison when necessary. At the end of February, it was the 
Newark garrison’s turn to suffer a siege, a fairly half-hearted affair led by forces led by 
Lincolnshire’s lord lieutenant, Lord Willoughby of Parham and Sir Thomas Ballard the 
recently appointed major general of Leicestershire, Lincolnshire and Nottinghamshire.7 This 
assault lasted two-days the 27 and 28 February and involved an attempted storm. Despite 
the fact that Newark’s defensive works were not yet completed the attack was poorly 
coordinated and ended in failure. Failure led to acrimony as Sir John Gell and Nottingham 
governor John Hutchinson both claimed that they had been let down by the other despite 
them both holding Ballard chiefly responsible for defeat. 8 As a result of this attack the 
garrison began re-developing its defences. 9  Thus in early 1643 the two parliamentarian 
commanders in the East Midlands, Grey of Groby and Willoughby who along with Ballard 
had failed to prevent the growth of the royalist hold on the region and had incurred the 
wrath of Sir John Gell: they were both now firmly on the back foot and would shortly come 
into contact with Cromwell.  
 
Simply put, Newark acted as a serious brake on parliament’s association of eastern counties 
and on communications between the association and London, and through Lincolnshire to 
the north: it interfered with several parliamentarian organisational structures. Lord 
Willoughby’s charge - Lincolnshire - was part of Lord Fairfax’s Northern Association; the 
town itself was within Lord Grey of Groby’s Midland Association and the garrison’s 
activities in south Lincolnshire threatened the territory of Lord Grey of Warke’s Eastern 
Association. With Newark’s garrison growing in strength, it was realised by all that another 
attempt to capture the town had to be made soon.  
 
Troops of horse from Newark could conduct logistical expeditions – what parliamentarian 
newspapers would refer to as raids – to establish taxation collection as far eastwards as the 
North Sea coast and as far north as the Humber estuary. They attempted to do the same in 
counties south of Lincolnshire too from outposts such as Stamford: it was through this 
latter activity that the midlands royalists first began to impress themselves upon the 
counties of the Eastern Association in early 1643. 
 
The command structure into which Cromwell fitted was anything but clear cut: his civil line 
of command was divided between the two Lord Greys, the commanders of the Midlands 
                                                          
6 British Library, Thomason Tracts, E86/1 Special Passages no.24 January 17th – 24th, np, Gell, J, 
‘True Relation’, p.63. 
7  British Library, Thomason Tracts, England’s memorable Accidents, 9-16 January 1643. 
Northamptonshire Record Office, Finch Hatton Mss 133, under Lincolnshire; Lord 
Willoughby was appointed lord lieutenant on 5 March 1641(2) originally for Lindsey: the Earl 
of Lincoln was initially in command of Kesteven and Holland. 
8 Hutchinson, L., Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson, (London, Longman, Orme and 
Rees, 1806) (Henceforth Hutchinson, Memoirs), pp.121-123; BL Thomason Tracts, E92/3 
Certain Informations, February 20th to March 6th, E86/41, Mercurius Aulicus, 9th week 1642(3); 
Lord Journal, Vol. 4, 5 March 1642, pp.624-629 
9  Hutchinson,, Memoirs, pp74-76; British Library, Thomason Tracts, E92/3, Certain 
Informations, , 20 February-6 March, 1642-3, British Library Thomason Tracts E86/41, 9th 
week, 1643. 
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Association and the Eastern Association because he served on two of the county 
committees established by parliament over the winter to manage the resources of each 
county under or soon to be under, its control. Cromwell sat on the Cambridgeshire 
committee which was in the Eastern Association and that for Huntingdonshire which was 
initially in the Midlands Association.10 His regiment was raised in both. For the most part, 
Cromwell acted as part of the Eastern Association forces which had been placed under the 
command of Major General William, Lord Grey of Warke in late 1642, but for much of the 
time during the early part of the war Cromwell was involved in affairs in Lincolnshire, Lord 
Willoughby of Parham’s command. Willoughby tended to keep his distance from Fairfax and 
the Northern Association and also may have resented the interference, if not the material 
support, from the Eastern Association. Cooperation between the Eastern Association and 
the Midlands Association under Thomas, Lord Grey of Groby was stilted by the 21-year old 
lord’s inexperience and caution. It is clear that this hazy and conflicted command structure 
was responsible for a range of problems.  
 
Much of the immediate funding of the Eastern Association tended to come from within 
including the Isle of Ely and Cambridgeshire the borderland between the association and 
disputed territory to the north. Protection of resources was at the forefront of Cromwell’s 
financial as well as military strategy for much of 1643.11 Troops serving in the isle and county 
also depended upon receiving money from across the region, including far-away Colchester 
from where Cromwell received men in March 1643.12 The presence of such troops enabled 
not just a defensive posture to be maintained in Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire, and 
also made possible offensive action in southern Lincolnshire – the Holland division - during 
April.13 On 7 April 1643 Lord Grey of Warke left his association to join the Earl of Essex’s 
field army within which his troops became a brigade. In his absence, Cromwell focussed 
firstly on the garrison which had been established by Newark royalists at Crowland, on the 
River Welland about half way between Stamford and Wisbeach, which blocked 
communications with Willoughby’s Lincolnshire. Willoughby’s forces were defeated at the 
Battle of Ancaster Heath, between Grantham and Sleaford, by Newark forces on 11 April 
and as a result Grantham and Stamford on the Great North Road were garrisoned. 
Stamford and Crowland now held the line of the Welland west of the fens. Peterborough 
was also occupied giving royalists a toe hold in the Eastern Association itself. This string of 
setbacks prompted Cromwell to go on the offensive.14 Peterborough was only held briefly 
before Cromwell retook it and turned on Crowland on 25 April. With Grey of Warke 
serving with Essex’s field army and the association forces depleted, Cromwell could not act 
alone and needed to cooperate with Willoughby to his north and Grey of Groby to his west 
if he wanted to achieve further security.15 He took his growing regiment and was joined by 
                                                          
10 Northamptonshire Record Office, Finch-Hatton Ms 133, np, under Cambridgeshire, dated 
5 March 1641(2). And Huntingdonshire dated 1 March 1642(3) He was also appointed again 
on 3 December and to the sequestration committee the following March. 
11 Cromwell and others’ letter to the Inhabitants of Fen Drayton, 8 March 1643.Abbott, I, 
p.217 
12 Wilbur Cortez Abbott. The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, (Cambridge, Mass. 
Harvard University Press, four volumes, 1937-1947). Henceforth Abbott, Writings, Vol. I, 
pp.220-21 
13 Abbott, Writings, Vol. 1, p. 224. 
14 British Library Thomason Tracts, Certain Informations, 17 April 1643, np 
15  Clive Holmes, Seventeenth-century Lincolnshire, (Lincoln, History of Lincoln Committee, 
1980), pp.70-72. 
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foot from Norfolk and Willoughby’s Lincolnshire troops. The aim was to enable a general 
advance northwards from the centre and the eastern flank of the Eastern Association via 
Crowland and King’s Lynn to Boston towards beleaguered Lincoln. Cromwell and Miles 
Hobart seized Crowland on 29 April.16 It was however, according to Clive Holmes a three-
day bombardment which persuaded the garrison to surrender rather than the regiments of 
Cromwell and Hobart’s actions on that last day. Nevertheless, the attack on Crowland was 
an early example of Cromwell coordinating a combined arms offensive.  
 
Cromwell was not satisfied with the level of cooperation he was receiving and five days after 
the seizure of Crowland, Cromwell complained about the contribution made by the 
neighbouring association under Grey of Groby. He pulled no punches in his letter to the 
Committee at Lincoln on 3 May 1643, writing, 
 
My Lord Grey hath now again failed me of the rendezvous at Stamford, 
notwithstanding that both he and I received Letters from His Excellency, 
commanding us both to meet, and, together with Sir John Gell and the 
Nottinghamshire forces to join with you.17  
  
Cromwell was not backward at suggesting a strategic approach at this early stage in his 
career. Grey was very much concerned that in his absence royalist Colonel General Henry 
Hastings would go on the offensive in the Leicestershire and be well-placed to attack his 
rear. Cromwell clearly believed and demonstrated that attacking Newark was more 
important. 
 
 ‘Believe it, it were better, in my poor opinion, Leicester were not, than that there 
should not be found an immediate taking of the field by our forces to accomplish our 
common ends’.  
 
This seems at first just to be a swipe at Grey’s caution, but the logic is sound; he was 
suggesting dis-garrisoning Leicester and making use of the additional soldiers in a field army. 
The town was to play no significant role in parliament’s cause, the garrison was for the most 
part overawed by Hastings’ larger regional army at Ashby. When Leicester was attacked by 
the king in May 1645 it was largely because the royalists judged it a quick win. However, 
Hastings had recently succeeded in recapturing Lichfield, which he and Prince Rupert had 
besieged for eleven days.18 His next concern seems to have been the parliamentarians in 
Derbyshire and Cheshire and possibly a rendezvous with the Earl of Derby, rather than an 
attack on Grey of Groby.19  
 
More broadly, Cromwell might have been making a case for developing field armies capable 
of besieging major strongholds rather than dispersing soldiers into large numbers of 
garrisons. Clearly at that early point in his career he was not frightened of playing one noble 
general off against the other for he was clearly prioritising Grey of Wark or even 
Willoughby’s strategy over Grey of Groby’s. Cromwell had assured the Lincolnshire 
committee that he would meet Grey of Groby the next day and remonstrate with him; if 
                                                          
16 A True Relation of a Great Victory, London, Benjamin Allen, 27 May, 1643, p.4; Holmes, 
Lincolnshire, p.166. 
17 Abbott, Writings, Vol. 1, p. 228-229. 
18 William Salt Library, Burney’s Newspapers, Vol. 1. Mercurius Aulicus, 16th week, p4. 
19 William Salt Library, SMS 550, no 4, Henry Hastings to Prince Rupert, 29 April 1643. 
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the committee could send someone to Cromwell on time he could then lend the weight of 
the committee’s opinion to it. Nevertheless, it is probable that Grey was involved in 
skirmishing around Loughborough on 4 May not receiving an ear-bashing from Cromwell.  
 
At the beginning of May the queen dispatched southwards a large convoy of ammunition 
from the cache she had brought into England from the continent, under the command of Sir 
Charles Lucas. The convoy was joined at Newark by General Hastings who then enabled its 
journey to join Charles at Oxford.20 There was little in the way of an attempt to stop this 
convoy despite the royalist preparations in the belief that such an event was likely. Grey of 
Groby had again failed to leave his county, leaving Oliver Cromwell and Captain John 
Hotham at Sleaford in Lincolnshire without sufficient forces to make any move on Newark, 
and the ammunition was soon safely in Banbury.21 Even so this campaign was instrumental in 
Cromwell’s development as a soldier. Despite failing to interrupt the convoy he and 
Hotham approached Newark and faced the garrison. The Newark regiments drove them off 
and chased them towards Grantham. Near there Cromwell turned to face them and 
defeated his pursuers.22 It was a minor fight in many ways, the convoy had passed, the 
queen’s ammunition train was by then in Oxford and the parliamentarians continued their 
retreat to Lincoln despite it. Important lessons had been learned and put into practice. It is 
clear that he had developed battlefield ability, and his wider view of the war in the region 
shows that he was developing strategic vision too. 23  
 
By 24 May Cromwell and Hotham had joined Lord Grey of Groby at Hutchinson’s base at 
Nottingham. 24  Grey may have felt safer there because whilst although Hastings’s 
headquarters was to his west and rear leaving his home territory vulnerable, should the 
royalists have made a move on Leicester, Ashby de la Zouch would in turn become be 
exposed along with Hastings' own rear. Grey was certainly was not averse to taking action, 
but his attack on the royalist outpost at Wiverton was driven off. Otherwise, there was 
little fighting and more serious than a disagreement about strategy was the fact that Captain 
John Hotham and his father, Sir John, were attempting to switch sides: something which 
would go a long way to handing the north to King Charles on a plate.25 Moreover, there 
were already large numbers of royalist forces in the vicinity of Newark and according to 
                                                          
20 HMC Hastings Vol. 2, pp.98-99, Sir Edward Nicholas to Hastings, 3 May 1643; Warburton, 
Vol. 2, pp.189-190, Sir Edward Nicholas to Prince Rupert, 11 May 1643.  
21 Warburton, Memoirs Sir Edward Nicholas to Prince Rupert, p.189.  
22 A True Relation of Great Victory, p4. John Vernon, The Young Horfe-man, or the honeft plain-
dealing Cavalier, (London, Andrew Coe, 1644), 
p3. 
23  S.R Gardiner, History of the Great Civil War, Gloucestershire, Windrush Press, 1991 
edition , Volume One, p.143. Charles Firth, Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of the Puritans in 
England, Oxford, OUP, 1966 edition , p.98; Ian Gentles, Oliver Cromwell God’s Warrior and the 
English Revolution, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p.27 
24 R. Bell, ed., Memorials of the Civil War Comprising the Correspondence of the Fairfax Family, 
with the Most Distinguished Personages Engaged in that Memorable Contest., (London, Richard 
Bentley, 1849), Vol. 1, Ulan Press edition , no date, (henceforth Fairfax) p45: John Hotham 
to Lord Fairfax, 24 May 1643.  
25 Martyn Bennett, ‘The Royalist war effort in the North Midlands, (unpublished PhD thesis, 
Loughborough University, 1987), p.191. 
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Hotham ‘we could not come to them without great disadvantage’.26 The queen left York on 
4 June with 4,500 men, having asked Hastings to join her for the journey beyond Newark.27 
It took two weeks for her army to reach Newark which she achieved without interference 
and joined Hastings there.28 The assembled parliamentarians claimed that they had prepared 
to fight the royalists, but they made no substantial attempt to stop the queen’s army.29 
Despite initial reports to the contrary, they remained together at Nottingham where they 
were attacked by the queen and Hastings a few days later. The parliamentarians were 
paralysed, Hastings and the queen took over the town trapping the parliamentarians in the 
seemingly impregnable castle, before moving on to attack and capture the parliamentarian 
garrison at Burton on Trent.30 By the time that Cromwell and Grey left Nottingham, the 
latter’s reputation was damaged and Hotham had been exposed as a would-be turncoat. 
Essex ordered Hotham’s arrest and he was detained at Nottingham before escaping and 
asserting that his accusers were men without honour or status: Cromwell he claimed, 
associated with religious radicals and both he and Nottingham colonel of horse Charles 
White were iconoclasts.31 Hotham made his way to Hull, where he and his father were 
arrested by the mayor and sent to London. 
 
Cromwell’s war-effort still in the hands of commanders like the two lords Grey and Lord 
Willoughby and he could exercise little initiative off the battlefield, yet he was showing a 
keen interest in strategic matters, trying to ensure that his home territory was protected 
against the queen’s army even though he himself was serving out of the region. In any case 
by mid-July one of the Greys was out of his hair, for Grey of Warke, who in any case was 
still in the south midlands was relieved of command and at least temporarily imprisoned for 
refusing to join a commission being sent to Edinburgh to treat with the Scots.32 
Despite Newark being secure and seemingly untouchable Willoughby scored a major 
success when he managed to capture Gainsborough. With a ferry crossing and its standing 
as an inland port, Gainsborough, whilst not as important as Newark, gave the Willoughby a 
route to the rest of the Northern Association and by extension he had given the Eastern 
Association a route to the north and the parliamentarian garrison at Hull, the line of the 
present A156 and A159: it also cut communications between Lincoln and the northern 
royalists. 
 
The captured royalist governor, the Earl of Kingston commander of Lincolnshire, Norfolk, 
Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire and Rutland, was killed by friendly fire as he was being 
shipped northwards along the Trent to Hull, sliced in two by a cannon ball in a grisly 
                                                          
26 Fairfax. Vol One, p.46, Hotham, Cromwell, Miles Hobart and Lord Grey to Lord Fairfax, 2 
June 1643. 
27  Letter, Queen Henrietta Maria to Hastings, 1 June 1643, Historical Manuscripts 
Commission Report on the Papers of Reginald Rawdon Hastings, London, HMSO, 1930, Volume 
2, pp.102-103.   
28 British Library, Thomason Tracts, Perfect Diurnal, 26 June – 3 July, 1643, np. 
29 Abbott, Writings, Vol 1. pp.234-235. 
30 Luke, Sir Samuel, Diary of Sir Samuel Luke, (Oxford, Oxford Record Society, 1950), Vol. 31, 
pp104-105, 117. Luke had heard that Lord Fairfax had captured 2000 of the queen’s forces 
and that Grey had attacked her near Newark. 
31 Abbott, Writings, Vol 1. p.237 
32 Abbott, Writings, Vol 1, p.236; House of Lords Journal, 25 July 1643, pp.147-150. 
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enactment of the prophesy he made about being divided in his loyalties.33 With the town in 
his hands, Willoughby set up base in Gainsborough. This could have been his most 
important contribution to parliament’s war-effort in the region, potentially offsetting his 
defeat at Ancaster Heath: now he could disrupt Newark’s control of eastern 
Nottinghamshire and curtail its expansion into Lincolnshire. However, almost immediately, 
he in turn was besieged by Lieutenant General Sir Charles Cavendish and Newark royalists. 
Willoughby of Parham’s success in taking the town from Kingston’s forces had had to be 
challenged and the Newark garrison had responded quickly.  
 
Cavendish’s quick response prompted a counter move by the Eastern Association. In the 
absence of Lord Grey of Wark who was with the Earl of Essex in the south midlands, Sir 
John Meldrum assembled forces from Grey of Wark’s association and from Lord Grey of 
Groby’s Midlands Association on 27 July at North Scarle west of Lincoln. He had about 300 
horse and Cromwell brought in another six or seven troops of horse and dragoons. These 
forces marched on Gainsborough from North Scarle via Lea and pushing back a royalist 
forlorn hope of dragoons, once they were close to the town. The ensuing battle of 
Gainsborough saw Cromwell and Meldrum win a convincing victory and routing Cavendish’s 
horse. The royalist commander was killed having being trapped in a bog between the Lea 
road and River Trent in the latter stages of the battle. However, whilst it appeared that 
Gainsborough was relieved and Willoughby rescued, the day was not over. As Cromwell, 
Meldrum and Willoughby met in the town it news reached them that suggested that the 
royalists had rallied north of the town. Cromwell was sent out to reconnoitre and chase 
them off. The initial units of royalists were pushed from Windmill Hill near Morton, but 
then a great shock hit the parliamentarians: these first units were joined by another, and  
after that another and another and another and as some counted about fifty colours of foot, 
with a great body of horse, which was indeed my Lord Newcastle’s army.34  
 
Newcastle chased the startled parliamentarians but Cromwell managed to bring his troops 
off in an orderly manner and the garrison troops also returned to the town. Gainsborough 
was quickly made ready for a new siege whilst Cromwell and Meldrum hurriedly retreated 
to Lincoln pursued by part of Newcastle’s Northern Horse. Although the horse and 
dragoons of Meldrum’s relief forces got away without loss, within days, Willoughby had 
been forced to surrender and the royalists reoccupied Gainsborough on the 30th. 35 
Willoughby made it to Lincoln but was soon driven out by Newcastle who had pursued him 
closely. Of this stage of the war, MP and diarist Bulstrode Whitlocke later noted that 
Willoughby was thanked by parliament for having ‘done very considerable service’ even 
though he then recounted the loss of Gainsborough; somewhat ironically noting of 
Cromwell that this campaign was the point which was ‘the beginning of his great fortunes 
and now he began to appear to the world’.36 On 5 August, in a plea for help addressed to 
Cromwell, Willoughby claimed abjectly that his men were demoralised: ‘deaded’ as he put it 
                                                          
33  Hutchinson Memoirs p.127; Newcastle, Memoirs, pp.27-28; British Library, Thomason 
Tracts, Mercurius Aulicus, Week 24, 1643, np.  
34 Abbott, Writings Vol I, pp.239, 241, Cromwell’s account refers to 50, the equivalent of five 
full regiments of foot, but the joint account suggests that there were 19 in Newcastle’s 
regiment alone which would have made that almost a double-regiment, which was the 
second one in the line of march. West, J., Oliver Cromwell and the battle of Gainsborough, 
(Boston, Richard Key, 1992), p.12. 
35 Luke, Diary, p127. 
36 Whitelock, Bulstrode, Memorials of the English Affairs, (Oxford, OUP, 1853), Vol 1, 209. 
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and many had run away, and asked Cromwell to join him at Boston in order to try and hold 
the town and thus keep Newcastle out of East Anglia. The following day, Cromwell enclosed 
Willoughby’s letter with his own to the association committee at Cambridge, thus revealing 
Willoughby’s military position and psychological state to its members. Furthermore he 
asked them to pass both letters to the county committees of Suffolk, Norfolk and Essex, 
thus spreading far and wide news of Willoughby’s failure to hold Lincolnshire.37 To hammer 
home the message about Willoughby’s unsuitability, during September Cromwell 
complained of Willoughby’s men ‘who did run away and gave no alarum to any of the rest of 
his forces’. 38  Within three weeks, Parliament allocated Lincolnshire to the Eastern 
Association, theoretically at least dealing with Willoughby’s incompetence. Although it was 
the beginning of the end of Willoughby’s career as the lord lieutenant of Lincolnshire, he 
was still involved in the next month’s campaign in the county, although the Earl of 
Manchester had replaced Grey of Wark and was firmly in charge. The earl had established a 
new regiment in Lincolnshire and appointed Edward King its colonel.39 The appointment is 
usually this discussed in relation to King’s Presbyterianism and the potential ructions this 
have caused amongst Cromwell’s men. But King’s appointment as a counterpoint to 
Willoughby’s command in his own county is more important. Cromwell appreciated King’s 
ability compared to Willoughby over and above any religious differences they had, although 
it is probable that on Cromwell’s part at least military prowess and the need for unity of 
purpose would override any qualms he made have had.40 
 
 Although Manchester was given command of Lincolnshire with the same powers as he had 
in the other six counties, Willoughby, with support in parliament, hung on to his command. 
In early 1644 Cromwell made a very personal attack on Willoughby in parliament detailing 
not just his military failings, but suggested moral impropriety too: he was not alone in his 
condemnation. 41 There were a series of attacks on the earl’s continuing authority, but he 
had a number of defenders too and there were even scuffles in a London pub between his 
supporters and detractors. Indeed the view within the Commons was mixed: Bulstrode 
Whitelock’s perspective was that the matter was less controversial then it appeared from 
Cromwell’s perspective and commented that ‘all was well reconciled’.42 Even so Cromwell’s 
attack had damaged the earl and Willoughby did himself no favours when it was discovered 
just over a week later, that he had challenged Manchester to a duel. Willoughby was then 
initially, as Cromwell had suggested, simply retained in Westminster on business. Then the 
Commons ordered Willoughby’s regiments of horse to remain in Lincolnshire and placed 
them under Manchester’s command. However, within weeks Willoughby had managed to 
return to the county and playing the role of regimental commander he joined Sir John 
Meldrum’s attack on Newark at the end of February 1644. This, the second siege of Newark 
ended in disaster when Prince Rupert and Lord Loughborough defeated, and received the 
surrender of, Meldrum’s entire army on 21 March.  
                                                          
37 Abbott, Writings, Vol 1. pp.250-251. 
38 Abbott, Writings, Vol 1. p.260. 
39 Leicestershire Archive Office, DE216, the Earl of Newcastle to Henry Hastings of 18 
September which asks him to support Henderson who is under pressure from ‘Lord 
Willoughby, Cromwell and their adherents’. 
40 Holmes, Lincolnshire, p.200 
41 House of Lords Journal, Vol 6, pp384-387. House of Commons’ Journal, Vol 3, p.372. 
Clive Holmes, ‘Colonel King and Lincolnshire Politics’. The Historical Journal, 16/3, 1973, 
pp.458-460. 
42 Bulstrode Whitelock, Memorials, Vol One, pp.238-239. 
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Whilst he was not involved in the second siege of Newark Cromwell had participated in 
seriously damaging the military reputations of two aristocratic generals, Willoughby was 
now finally removed and out of the way; Grey of Groby was still in post, but his reputation 
was severely damaged and would be out of the way before the end of the year.   
 
It was as Grey of Groby’s first military career sputtered to its end that Cromwell embarked 
on the course which would bring about the demise of the Earl of Manchester’s career in the 
field. Following the lack lustre performance of parliament’s combined forces during and in 
the aftermath of the second Battle of Newbury. The failure to defeat the king in what 
seemed to be propitious circumstances had many causes and not one of the generals 
involved, Essex, Cromwell, Manchester or Waller included come out of an analysis of the 
defeat unblemished. However, unlike that of Manchester’s other detractors, Cromwell’s 
attack on Manchester in November 1644 brought Newark to the fore again in a quarrel 
between the Earl of Manchester and Oliver Cromwell but which embraced the Earl of Essex 
and would drag into it Sir William Waller and Major General Lawrence Crawford and 
embroiled the Scots in a proposal to indict Cromwell as an incendiary.43 ‘Lieutenant general 
Cromwell’s Narrative’ is perhaps the best known of the accounts of the case Cromwell 
made against the earl of Manchester and it reiterated something of the spoken attack 
Cromwell had made in the House of Commons on Monday 25 November.44 However, it 
may not have been a single-author piece: the style of the writing suggests that soldiers Sir 
William Waller and Sir Arthur Hesilrige and politician Sir Harry Vane may have had a hand 
in its composition. The latter part of the ‘narrative’ is far better known as it is there that it 
focusses on the charges about Manchester’s behaviour at the second Battle of Newbury and 
because of the inclusion of the debate when Waller, Cromwell and others were witness to 
Manchester’s lugubrious statement  
 
If we beat the King 99 times he would be King still, and his posterity, and we 
subjects still; but if he beat us but once we should all be hanged, and our 
posterity undone’.45  
 
This rightly famous passage highlights the lack of commitment shown at the high command 
level to gaining an outright victory over the king from a position of strength.46 On the other 
hand, the earlier part of the narrative centres upon the weeks following the conclusion of 
the earl’s participation in the northern campaign; the days after he left York following its 
surrender. Cromwell claimed that it took some time for him to understand what was going 
on, and that only later in the year did he realise that Manchester’s actions were predicated 
on his desire that the war should be won thorough negotiation rather than gaining a 
dominant position through an outright victory. The earl, he argued, was:  
 
                                                          
43  Journal of the House of Lords, Vol., 7, 22 November, 1644, p76; Indeed, Whitelock 
believed that Cromwell attacked officers from Essex’s army more than any other. 
Whitelock, vol. 1. pp.338 & pp.343-347. The attempt to charge Cromwell with being an 
incendiary involved the Scots’ English Presbyterian allies, including the commander of the 
regiment Cromwell’s initial troop had been assigned to, Sir Phillip Stapleton. 
44 Journal of the House of Commons. Vol 7, pp.703-705. 
45 Abbott, Writings, Vol 1, p.310.  
46 Abbott, Writings, Vol 1, p.302. 
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most at fault for most of those miscarriages and the ill-consequences of them. And 
because I had a great deal of reason to think that his Lordship’s miscarriages in these 
particulars was neither accidents (which could not be helped) nor through his 
improvidence only but through his backwardness to all action.  
 
Cromwell explained that he had at first hand observed the earl’s ‘continued backwardness’ 
was ‘contrary to advice given him’ and ‘contrary to commands received’. In other words the 
earl was not only failing to act in the collegiate way expected of a commander in the 
seventeenth century, he was disobeying orders. It was also pointed out that in the six weeks 
or so between leaving York on 15 July and 3 September when he moved south from Lincoln, 
he held just one council of war.  
 
After the successful campaign in the middle of 1644 which saw the defeat of Prince Rupert 
and the capture of York the earl, Cromwell claimed, had frequently thrown away chances. 
These chances, he argued, mainly focussed on Newark. Cromwell asserted that the earl had 
plenty of time and opportunity to attack Newark and its satellite garrisons before being 
ordered south to after the summer’s defeat of Sir William Waller at Cropredy Bridge and 
the destruction of the Earl of Essex’s veteran army at Lostwithiel. However, according to 
Malcolm Wanklyn Manchester was well aware of the importance of Newark and on 22 July 
proposed attacking the garrison himself. This would not be surprising, Manchester’s 
successes in Lincolnshire in late 1643 had largely been negated by the Newark forces, 
especially after the second siege in March 1644. It may also be the case that Manchester was 
becoming annoyed by Cromwell’s various urgings, firstly Newark and then perhaps for a 
vigorous march to the west: in any case he was caught in the middle for the Committee of 
both kingdoms had ordered the earl to remain where he was as it feared that Prince Rupert 
was rebuilding his army.47 
 
Newark and indeed the north midlands royalist cause as a whole was vulnerable in the late 
summer of 1644. It moved swiftly from being a communications hub between north and 
south, east and west to being the front line following the collapse of the royalist north. Most 
importantly a good deal of the region’s man-power and materiel had been invested in Prince 
Rupert’s York venture and in the north in general. From January 1644 when Sir Charles 
Lucas took contingents of Hastings’s army northwards to combat the invading army of the 
Solemn League and Covenant, onwards Newcastle had called upon the resources of his 
lieutenant general. Shortly after the relief of Newark in late March, the Newark Horse 
under Major General George Porter had been called north to support the Yorkshire 
royalists hold down territory in the wake of challenges from Hull, and he had taken part of 
the Belvoir garrison with him. Later whilst the Earl of Newcastle had become bottled up in 
York following the defeat of Sir John Belasyse at the Battle of Selby on 10 April, Lord 
Goring and the Northern Horse had been sent to camp on Newark’s lush but already hard-
pressed meadows. Not only had these extra brigades eaten into the resources of the region, 
but Loughborough was asked to reinforce Goring when he returned north. 
 
When Prince Rupert began organising his relief force for the march to York. Lord 
Loughborough and Newark’s governor, Sir Richard Byron committed yet more of their 
forces to the war in the north. Derbyshire and Staffordshire regiments under Sir Thomas 
Milward, Sir Rowland Eyre, Sir John Freschville and Sir Thomas Leveson had been involved 
                                                          
47 Wanklyn, M., ‘A General Much Maligned: the Earl of Manchester as army commander in 
the second Newbury campaign: July to November 1644’, War in History 14, 2, 2007, p.137  
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in the Battle of Marston Moor as had horse regiments, like Sir Anthony Eyre’s from Newark. 
Somewhat over a thousand men from the region had been on the field of Marston Moor on 
2 July 1644. Leveson’s horse had been scattered during the defeat of the royalist right, whilst 
the others, after their initial success under Goring’s leadership on the royalist left wing were 
swept up in the final rout. The subsequently dispersed regiments would make their way 
back home over time, but as Manchester bore down on the midlands, they were still a long 
way north.  
 
Loughborough and Byron had heard firstly that the Battle of Marston Moor had been a 
victory and later that it had been ‘an Edgehill battle’ of unclear outcome, and were preparing 
yet more reinforcements for Rupert to be sent to join him at Doncaster.48 It would be the 8 
July when real doubts began to set in and Byron suggested to Loughborough that they stay 
put: but even then Manchester was still outside York and would be for another week.49 It 
would be a further eleven days before the truth dawned and the scale of the defeat in battle 
and the subsequent loss of York reached Lord Loughborough, by which time Manchester 
was on his way.50 Cromwell and other officers in the Eastern Association army realised 
Newark was vulnerable and urged Manchester to attack the town quickly, and about this 
time Manchester indeed had suggested to the Committee of Both kingdoms that he should 
do so. Instead the earl stayed lingered further north around Doncaster for over a week 
before moving towards Lincoln, where he would then stay for a month. 
 
Cromwell and others also suggested that garrisons close to Doncaster, such as Sheffield, 
Tickhill, Bolsover and Welbeck were also ripe for the picking. Indeed the royalist governor 
Major Monkton surrendered Tickhill Castle on 26 July as soon as John Lilburne and Eastern 
Association army dragoons quartered in the town an action to which Manchester reacted 
with anger directed at Lilburne. Welbeck surrendered on 2 August and Sheffield followed 
on 11 August, surrendering to Major General Crawford and Colonel Pickering. As the earl 
made Lincoln his base, Crawford marched into Derbyshire to support Sir John Gell and John 
Hutchinson in their siege of [South] Wingfield, which had begun back on 17 July.51 Wingfield 
fell on 21 August.52 Bolsover also fell and thus the Eastern Association army had bagged five 
north midland and south Yorkshire garrisons.53 Essentially the new royalist front line had 
ceased to exist in less than a month. 54  Cromwell believed that more could be done, 
identifying Newark and its satellites, Shelford and Wiverton and the fortress on the edge of 
the vale, Belvoir Castle as preliminary targets. Manchester, perhaps angrily listened to the 
advice Cromwell claimed he had offered, and had already tried to get the Committee of 
                                                          
48 HMC, Hastings, Vol II, pp.129-130. Loughborough to Byron and Byron to Rupert, both 
dated 6 July 1644. 
49 HMC Hastings, Vol II, p.131, Byron to Hastings, 8 July 1644. 
50 HMC, Hastings, Vol II, pp.131-132, Byron to Loughborough, 19 July 1644. 
51 William Salt Library, Burney’s Newspapers, Vol. 1. Perfect Diurnal, no 53, 29 July – 5 
August, 1644, p23. Refers to 500 of Manchester’s horse preventing Hastings’s attempted 
relief of the siege.  
52 William Salt Library, Burney’s Newspapers, Vol 1. Diary or Exact Journal 21-28 August 1644, 
p.25.  
53 Cavendish, Newcastle, pp22, 87-88; Diary or Exact Journal, (London 1640) no. 14, 21-28 
August, np. British library, Thomason Tracts, Perfect Occurrences, no. 3, 23-30 August, 1644, 
np. 
54 Gell, ‘True Relation’, pp67, 69; Abbott, Writings, Vol I, pp303-304; Newcastle, Memorials, 
pp. 87-92.  
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Both Kingdoms to authorise an attack. Had they agreed he would have swept away the 
eastern flank of the royalist midlands as well as its northern front. Instead Manchester was 
ordered to stay put for the time being and in the eyes of his detractors, he began to 
prevaricate, claiming to be waiting for the advice of the absent Lawrence Crawford, and 
would take no action until the major general returned.  
 
When he did return, Crawford supported the idea of an attack on Newark. Manchester 
now called a council of war which, according to Cromwell‘s narrative, decided upon action 
against Newark. Faced with a decision promoted by his two subordinate generals 
Manchester reluctantly agreed and plans were made for a campaign. However, soon 
afterwards Manchester possibly feeling under pressure from London let the plans. 
 
However, Manchester was then ordered by the Committee of both Kingdoms to march 
westwards to support Sir William Brereton who had found himself beset by Prince Rupert, 
in a move which seemingly confirmed parliament’s and the committee’s fears about the 
prince’s resurgent forces. Manchester had little inclination for a march westwards and told 
the committee that he intended to attack Newark, using the arguments advanced by 
Cromwell that Newark represented too great a threat to the Eastern Association, 
Lincolnshire in particular for him to leave the area. As a temporary measure Manchester 
firstly agreed to send Brereton a detachment of horse, but then reneged on even this token 
gesture.55 Cromwell was to go on to complain that Manchester had billeted his army on 
areas of Lincolnshire already controlled by parliamentarians whilst leaving the rest of 
Lincolnshire open to ‘raids’ from Newark.56 
 
The earl continued to dissemble in the face of both orders from London and his officers by 
appearing to suggest targeting Belvoir and the Newark satellite garrisons, Wiverton and 
Shelford to close in on Newark. His officers, possibly making the best of a bad job 
encouraged the proposal to attack satellite garrisons ‘in case he would not meddle against 
Newark’, in other words they feared that he would never tackle the main garrison and at 
least capturing the smaller ones would damage Newark’s potential. However, Manchester 
spent an inordinately long time deciding which garrison to attack first as a means of 
attacking none of them.57 The earl’s commanders were not alone in feeling frustrated with 
the lack of decisive action in the midlands. The newspaper Parliamentary Scout, declared that 
none of the region’s smaller garrisons would have taken Manchester much time to capture: 
‘they being apprehended a work of no great difficulty’ which would have leave Manchester 
able to tackle Newark. On the other hand just a week later the paper had some backhanded 
praise for Manchester a week later pointing out that Leicestershire and Derbyshire 
parliamentarians owed much to him as their own forces ‘appear little outside their own 
counties’. Rather prophetically it suggested that it would now be left to the Earl of Leven to 
come south and capture Ashby de la Zouch and Newark: this would partly come true, but 
not for over year and a half.58 Parliamentary Scout’s criticism of the midlands forces was one 
of the last nails in the coffin of Lord Grey of Groby’s first civil war military career, the 
                                                          
55 Abbott, Vol I, p.304. 
56 Whitelock, Memorials, Vol. 1. p.339: some of these raids were effective and in November 
part of the Lincolnshire county committee was captured. 
57 Abbott, Writings, Vol I, p.304. 
58 British Library, Thomason Tracts, Parliamentary Scout, no 64, 5-13 September, 1644, np; 
Parliamentary Scout, no. 65, 12-19 September, 1644, np.  
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royalist newspaper, Mercurius Aulicus had already somewhat sarcastically noted a month 
earlier that Grey had surrendered his commission as it meant nothing by this point.59 
 
Cromwell was perhaps less aware of the catastrophe down south. The Committee of both 
Kingdoms and parliament had been focussed on the Earl of Essex’s increasingly precarious 
campaign in the south west during August. However, shortly after Crawford had re-joined 
the Eastern Association Army the Earl of Essex was defeated at Lostwithiel, although he had 
managed to pass his horse through the royalist cordon trapping him on the Fowey Peninsula, 
the foot had been taken prisoner and disarmed before being sent on a long march towards 
Plymouth. Parliament had invested its hopes for rescuing the earl or at least distracting the 
attention of the king’s forces pursuing him into Cornwall, Waller’s army was simply not up 
to the task following its defeat in the summer. Parliament and the committee were forced to 
turn to Manchester. On 7 September they gave him his orders: 
 
We are commanded, by the Houses of Parliament, to desire you with all possible 
Speed to march towards Dorchester, in Dorsettshire, with all the Forces you can of 
Horse and Foot; the great Importance whereof, upon the sad Accident in the West 
(of which your Lordship hath received Intelligence from the Committee of both 
Kingdoms), requireth your best Care and Diligence, and will admit of no Delay.60 
 
Essex was informed that both Manchester and Waller had bene ordered to march with ‘all 
possible speed’ and that plans were afoot to rearm his forces, something which Manchester 
confirmed the following day from Huntingdon in a letter to his predecessor, Lord Grey of 
Wark, now the speaker of the House of Lords. 
 
I have received your Lordship's Letter; and shall obey the Command of the House of 
Peers, to make all possible Speed I can to march towards Dorchester. I am very sorry 
to hear of the sad Accident in the West. I trust, God will make up this great Loss.61 
 
With matters in hand regarding rescuing Essex and restoring the balance of power in the 
south, parliament took time to thank its servants: Cromwell in particular was singled out in 
terms which matched the press accounts of the Battle of Marston Moor; and gave thanks to 
Lieutenant General Cromwell, for his Fidelity in the Cause in hand; and in particular for the 
faithful Service performed by him in the late Battle near York, where God made him a special 
Instrument in obtaining that great Victory over Prince Rupert's and the Marquis 
of Newcastle's Armies there.62 
 
About a fortnight later, Parliament resolved that Manchester and Waller join forces as soon 
as they could and remain together to cooperate as the Committee of Both Kingdoms saw 
                                                          
59 British Library, Thomason Tracts, Mercurius Aulicus, 33rd week, 1644, np. Ironically Grey’s 
career would continue to have links to Cromwell’s. He helped Colonel Thomas Pride 
identify Presbyterian MOs during the purge of the Commons on 7 December 1648 and in 
1651 he would play a not unimportant role in Cromwell’s greatest victory at Worcester. 
60 Journal of the House of Lords, Vol 6, 7 Sept. 1644, p498; this and all subsequent entries 
for this Journal are accessed through the British history Online website. 
61 Journal of the House of Lords, Vol 6, 9 September, 1644, p490. 
62 House of Commons Journal , Vol 3, 13 Sept 1644, pp626-627 this and all subsequent 
entries for this Journal are accessed through the British history Online website 
 - 15 - 
fit.63 Three weeks later, by 12 October, Manchester had based himself at Reading and sent 
them a report on all of his recent movements.64  
 
Cromwell as we know of course did not limit his attack on Manchester to his actions in the 
East Midlands, but he linked his accusations about the earl’s dilatoriness there to the 
campaign in the south, realising that even late in 1644, parliament still prioritised the defeat 
of the king’s Oxford field army rather than maintaining the local associations. He would also 
be familiar with the parlous state of Waller’s army since the Battle of Cropredy Bridge back 
in June and the devastation wrought on Essex’s army at Lostwithiel in early September, in 
any case at least by the time he was denouncing Manchester in parliament even if the battle 
itself had coincided with the start of Manchester’s sluggardly march Therefore, Cromwell 
made explicit the important point that Manchester’s perceived failings in the midlands had 
limited his contribution to the campaign in the south because he had to leave far more of his 
army behind in the region because of the threat from Newark, whereas if it had been 
captured, local forces would or should be sufficient to hold the territory, an argument 
similar to that advanced by Parliament’s Scout issue 65.65 At this point Cromwell’s narrative 
turned to the earl’s slow march towards the south and onto the better known sections on 
the Newbury campaign itself.66 The narrative was in its turn supported by the testimony of 
Waller and Hesilrige and somewhat more damningly several of the colonels from 
Manchester’s own army, some of whom would have been smarting from Manchester’s 
threat in mid-September to have them hanged for suggesting that he move southwards 
more quickly. This outburst is perhaps suggestive of Manchester’s patience wearing thin. It 
may be possible that he resented his juniors, including Cromwell pressing their strategic 
views upon him. But if he did only hold one council of war, then this may be symptomatic of 
him failing to share information with them about his orders from London that prevented 
him from attacking Newark when he and his officers were actually in agreement on the 
importance of the garrison. Even though Major General Crawford was, like the earl himself, 
a Presbyterian, and no friend to Cromwell, he supported the gist of the attack on the earl’s 
performance: Manchester may have isolated himself from his own commanders in 
September 1644. Even though he had the support in parliament to enable him to attack 
Cromwell’s lacklustre performance in the Newbury campaign failing to nurture his juniors’ 
support proved costly.67 The aftermath of the assault on the earl is well known: following 
Cromwell’s decision not to continue his attack on the Earl of Manchester, parliament 
introduced a self-denying ordinance which made it mandatory for members of the 
Commons and the Lords to hand in their commissions and left it upto parliament to 
reappoint a select few on exceptional bases. At the same time a new, remodelled army was 
established from the remnants of the three armies of Essex, Manchester and Waller. This 
decision left three chief armies in the north and south west untouched, and for a time 
sections of Waller’s and the Earl of Manchester’s armies operated together in the west 
under the command of Waller and Cromwell who were granted temporary commissions as 
the new army was modelled. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                          
63 Journal of the House of Lords, Vol 6, 21 September 1644. p711. 
64 House of Commons Journal, Vol 13, 14 October 1644, p662. 
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Thus Newark had become a stick with which Cromwell beat down the careers of 
aristocratic generals during the war. It is unlikely that Whitelock was correct when he 
claimed that he was told that the whole point of the attack on Manchester and Essex in late 
1644 was a plot to bring about a levelling process which would remove the aristocracy or at 
least the two earls from the traditional role in army command. 68 It is far more likely that 
Cromwell was concerned to remove what he saw as half-hearted warriors from command. 
It would be a consistent policy of his during 1643 and 1644. Cromwell’s commitment to 
prosecuting the war vigorously was demonstrated in other ways too, including the 
willingness to support people like Colonel King, with very different religious conviction to 
his own, if he believed they could ‘do the job’.  
 
Cromwell’s view of Newark was sound at every stage. In the early part of 1643, Newark 
was able exert control over much of Lincolnshire, breaking links between parliamentarians 
in the north and the Eastern Association. Even when the Eastern Association periodically 
occupied central Lincolnshire and the county town from late summer onwards, the Newark 
garrison continued to interfere in parliamentarian attempts to control the county fully. This 
state of affairs continued throughout the following year and into 1645, as Cromwell 
predicted in his complaints about Manchester’s war record. Even when Newark was 
neutralised from November 1645 onwards, it took two armies to keep it in check and 
surrender six months later was ordered by the king as part of the politics of his surrender 
deal rather than for military reasons. Cromwell thereby had proved, even as an early career 
soldier, to have a clear strategic vision. Moreover, it was a vison which he felt should be 
shared by his aristocratic commanders, Willoughby and Manchester and his associate Lord 
Grey of Groby. Whilst all three were to lose their field commands in 1644, ironically Lord 
Grey was to work with Cromwell again in 1651 during the Worcester campaign with 
greater success. There is little surprise that certain parliamentarian aristocrats saw 
Cromwell as a challenge and that Whitelock thought that in terms of military command 
Cromwell was a ‘leveller’; three coronets was a high tally even if at least half the credit 
belonged to the Newarkers. Cromwell’s concern was military but whilst Newark remained 
a major concern throughout the war, in the wake of the Battle of Naseby Cromwell showed 
clearly that it was not simply an obsession and demonstrated that he could identify a 
different strategic purpose. On 15 June 1645, the North Midlands lay wide open. The king 
was retreating north westwards with the remains of his army, Lord Loughborough and the 
Newark garrison had invested heavily in the king’s advance through the midlands in May and 
June and they were, like they had been a year earlier, vulnerable to concerted attack: 
Loughborough surrendered Leicester within days. Yet it seems that Fairfax and Cromwell 
had decided to prioritise the destruction of the chief remaining royalist field army, that in 
the south west led by Lord Goring. Destroying that army would in essence make holding on 
to increasingly isolated pockets of territory less and less strategically valuable. However, 
Cromwell had been right to identify Newark as a major strategic priority in 1643 and 1644; 
reduction of the garrison either before or after Marston Moor would have probably 
hastened the end of the war dramatically; it was to parliament’s cost that it appointed a 
series of commanders who did not share Cromwell’s strategic vision, nor his aggressive 
determination. 
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